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Redeﬁning Diaspora through a
Phenomenology of Postmemory1
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This article seeks to intervene in the debates about the deﬁnition of di-
aspora by attending to the way in which it is a phenomenon, rooted in
a particular kind of experience and consciousness. This approach seeks
to move beyond ontological deﬁnitions based on categorical criteria
toward a more phenomenological deﬁnition that can help us better
understand the lived experience of diasporic subjects and the formation
of diasporic communities. While these groups do not exist as entities
that have some common essence or nature, I insist that they do exist
phenomonologically. Rather than an objective, prescriptive deﬁnition of
diaspora, this essay explores the subjective, descriptive quality of dias-
pora when approached from the inside, as an experience. A phenomeno-
logical approach, therefore, can rescue the term diaspora from its over-
extensions and case-speciﬁc limitations. A key consideration will be
the role of memory in creating the phenomenon of diaspora. Diaspora
must be understood as a phenomenon that emerges when displaced sub-
jects who experience the loss of an “origin” (whether literal or symbolic)
perpetuate identiﬁcations associated with those places of origin in sub-
sequent generations through the mechanisms of postmemory.
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Deﬁning Diaspora
There has been much debate over the deﬁnition of diaspora in an
effort to curb the explosive proliferation of meanings it has taken on in
the last couple of decades. Once its use expanded beyond its early appli-
cation to “dispersed” Jewish and Armenian communities, the term dia-
spora evolved from being a proper noun to a common noun synonymous
with “dispersion” in general. Scholars like Khachig Tölölyan (2007) have
rightly called attention to how the ease with which diaspora is used as a
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synonym for a myriad of related phenomena blurs signiﬁcant distinctions
that should be addressed. What is at stake is the potential for diaspora to
continue to be an enabling and productive critical term that connects his-
tories of displacements with questions of power, identiﬁcation, race/eth-
nicity, and citizenship (among others).
One typical approach to this problem has been to develop a list of
characteristics that are intrinsic to the dynamics of diaspora and that
transcend each and every individual case (Butler 2001, 89). The prob-
lem with this approach is that most existing deﬁnitions formed along
these lines are too categorical and reductive. They are too often
informed by teleological and idealist understandings of the nation-state
as well as by an essentialist tendency to see diasporas as unitary actors
and “bona ﬁde actual entities” (Brubaker 2005, 10).
On the other end of the spectrum, postcolonial critics like Stuart Hall
(1990) and James Clifford (1994) avoid a deﬁnition altogether in favor
of an emphasis on the “necessary heterogeneity and diversity” (Hall
1990, 235) of diasporic identity and the hybridity, ﬂuidity, and con-
stantly changing nature of diasporic experience. Rogers Brubaker (2005)
argues that we should think of diaspora as primarily linguistic—“an
idiom, a stance, a claim”—and as such, a category of practice rather
than substance (12). Stéphane Dufoix (2008) goes so far as to suggest
that the term diaspora is “theoretically lifeless” and not in the least use-
ful for any role other than as “a rallying cry” that tries to give coherence
and visibility to a group (107). The problem with the kinds of deﬁnitions
on this end of the spectrum is that they are so open and abstract that
they lack any speciﬁcity or relevance to diaspora as an actual social
phenomenon of connections between communities often born of dis-
placement, loss, and mourning. I ﬁnd Lily Cho’s formulation of diaspora
helpful. As she very eloquently observes, “Diaspora brings together
communities not quite nation, not quite race, not quite religion, not
quite homesickness, yet they still have something to do with nation,
race, religion, longings for homes which may not exist. There are collec-
tivities and communities which extend across geographical spaces and
historical experiences. There are vast numbers of people who exist in
one place and yet feel intimately related to another” (2007, 13; emphasis
added). There are. How diasporas become indexical and observable in
this way is what concerns me in this essay.
Whether too categorical or too open, a common issue is that current
deﬁnitions ignore the way in which diaspora is a phenomenon and a
lived experience. I agree with Lily Cho (2007, 14) that diasporas are
“not just there,” that they are not simply “collections of people” or “ob-
jects of analysis” to be identiﬁed and classiﬁed. I do, however, want to
take her thesis that “diaspora is a condition of subjectivity” and push it
further. Perhaps it would be more precise to say that to be diasporic is
a condition of subjectivity, and that diaspora as a social phenomenon
emerges from such conditions of subjectivity. In this essay I would like
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to focus on what creates both diasporic subjectivity and its passage
through inter-subjectivity to the formation of “diasporas.” An important
concept that has not been adequately explored in this respect is that of
the role of memory, and speciﬁcally postmemory.
Marianne Hirsch, in her writings on family photography and the
Holocaust, uses the term postmemory to describe “the relationship of
the second generation to powerful, often traumatic, experiences that
preceded their births but were nevertheless transmitted to them so
deeply as to seem to constitute memories in their own right” (2008,
103). The second generation cannot literally, of course, “remember” the
experiences of those who came before, but postmemory describes the
way in which a categorically different kind of memory is constructed by
means of the stories, images, and behaviors among which the second
generation grew up. Hirsch argues that “these experiences were trans-
mitted to them so deeply and affectively as to seem to constitute mem-
ories in their own right” (2008, 106). Postmemory is not identical to
memory: it is “post”—after, secondhand—but at the same time, it ap-
proximates memory in having a kind of affective force. Postmemory is
distinguished from memory in the discontinuous subjective attachment
to what one has not experienced and in the mediation of generational
distance. It is different from history by the emphasis on profound per-
sonal connection to individuated histories.
Hirsch’s work shows how memory and postmemory are deeply in-
volved in subject-formation and subjectivity. She focuses on survivors
of the Holocaust who have been exiled from their places of origin and
for whom memory is not only an act of active recollection, but also of
mourning, “mourning often tempered by anger, rage, and despair”
(1997, 243). Hirsch argues that the children of exiled Holocaust survi-
vors, although they themselves have not lived through the trauma of
forced separation from home, remain deeply marked by their parents’
experiences. They experience home as “always elsewhere,” and their
own existences as perpetually diasporic. An important thing to note is
that the legacy of Holocaust survivors’ traumatic experiences on the
subjectivities of their children does not depend on the verbal transmis-
sion of “memories.” Postmemory can be just as powerfully shaped by
the absence of such speech acts, by the careful silences and nonverbal
states of mourning that saturate the environment of a home.2 Eva Hoff-
man suggests that the “language” of the family encompasses more than
the verbal: “in my home, as in so many others, the past broke through in
the sounds of nightmares, the idioms of sighs and illness, of tears and
acute aches that were the legacy of the damp attic and of the conditions
my parents endured during their hiding” (qtd. in Hirsch 2008, 112).
What Hoffman is describing is the language of the body, of symptoms
that are often unconscious, that are nevertheless forcefully communi-
cated within familial space. Other features, such as certain cultural ob-
jects (family photographs, keepsakes from the abandoned world), “Old
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World” rituals and social conventions, and the experience of a language
barrier between generations, are examples of other elements in familial
space that can contribute to the shaping of postmemory.
While I ﬁnd Hirsch’s term valuable, I ﬁnd her almost exclusive appli-
cation of it to the second generation limiting. Hirsch perhaps focuses
on the second generation because the level of identiﬁcation with the
original Holocaust survivor generation is stronger than with subsequent
generations. Her tendency to formulate postmemory in this way largely
stems from her focus on collective trauma as the sole point of “origin”
for postmemory. If we, however, attend to the phenomenon of post-
memory in and of itself, apart from experiences of collective trauma
(though trauma is certainly a valid and intimately related issue), we
quickly see that the intergenerational transmission of memory is always
happening on some level within kinship structures. Moreover, each gen-
eration, each family, and each individual experiences its own form of
postmemory, which is always already marked by the previous genera-
tions’ postmemory and which will also inﬂuence the generations after.
The workings of postmemory can thus be used as a lens through which
to analyze the effects of certain historical events or collective phenom-
ena, whether it is the effects of the Holocaust in Hirsch’s study, or the
effects of displacement or migration in this one.3 But to say that post-
memory is constructed out of trauma is to limit the concept too nar-
rowly. This is especially evident when Hirsch speaks of diaspora and
postmemory together. I understand statements like the following as
actually reversed in logic: “[the] condition of exile from the space of
identity, [the] diasporic experience, is a characteristic aspect of post-
memory” (1997, 243). Postmemory is, I suggest, a characteristic aspect
of diaspora and not the other way around. Again, Hirsch reverses the
relation of postmemory to diaspora when she suggests that “the aes-
thetics of postmemory is a diasporic aesthetics of temporal and spatial
exile that needs simultaneously to (re)build and to mourn” (1997, 245).
The “aesthetics” of diaspora, marked by feelings of loss and processes
akin to mourning, is actually born of the dynamics of postmemory.
What Hirsch refers to as the “aesthetics of postmemory” is not always a
“diasporic aesthetics”; a diasporic aesthetics, however, is always an
aesthetics of the kind of postmemory that is marked by temporal and
spatial exile. Since the workings of postmemory can occur within a so-
ciocultural context that does not involve migration or displacement,4 it
is not that postmemory is characterized in some essential way by dia-
spora. Rather, the phenomenon of diaspora emerges from the psychical
and sociocultural dynamics of postmemory.
I want to suggest that diasporic identities are consolidated and con-
structed primarily via mechanisms of postmemory. What is essential in
deﬁning diaspora by way of postmemory is the emphasis within the con-
cept of postmemory on (1) the inter/transgenerational transmission of
memory and (2) the identiﬁcations forged within familial space. In
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order to grasp more deeply how displacement from a place of origin
(whether literal or symbolic) affects subsequent generations, we will
now turn our attention to formulating a phenomenological sketch of
diasporic postmemory.
Toward a Phenomenology of (Diasporic) Postmemory
In order to appreciate the distinctive experience of postmemory, it is
useful to compare and contrast it to the experience of memory. Philoso-
pher Paul Ricoeur (2006) has contributed signiﬁcantly to the develop-
ment of a phenomenology of memory in his important book Memory,
History, Forgetting. I will build upon his conclusions to formulate more
speciﬁcally a phenomenology of postmemory, which is distinct from,
yet intertwined with, the phenomenology of memory. The main differ-
ences between the experience of postmemory and the experience of
memory concern (1) the subjective relationship between the objects of
memory (memories) and the work of memory, (2) the role of the imagi-
nation, and (3) the signiﬁcance of affect in relation to the Other.
Ricoeur relies on Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological procedure
(1931) in his formulation of the experience of memory. This procedure
involves identifying the constitutive phases of every intentional experi-
ence, which Husserl terms noesis and noema. Noesis refers to the pro-
cess of intention that assigns meaning to intentional objects, while
noema stands for the intentional object itself, that is, that which is
intended or meant by an act. They are related such that every noetic
phase of consciousness corresponds to a noematic phase of conscious-
ness. Ricoeur observes that for the phenomenon of memory, the noesis
is the act of remembering and the noema are the memories themselves.
But who is doing the remembering? While Ricoeur’s discussion of the
reciprocal constitution of personal and collective memory (2006, 95)
complicates a simple answer to this question, the presupposition is never-
theless that the noesis-noema of memory is attached under one individ-
ual consciousness: one’s memory is of one’s own memories. Yet Ricoeur
emphasizes, along with Maurice Halbwachs, that “one never remembers
alone,” that the social framework is a dimension inherent in the work of
recollection. The memories the ego searches for are the result of the con-
ﬂuence of internal and external inﬂuences that are often imperceptible
(2006, 122). I want to suggest that postmemory further complicates the
mutual implication of individual and collective memory by the structural
mechanism that drives it: the idea that one’s past can be passed on to
another. The focus is not only one’s memory of one’s own memories, but
also one’s memory of another’s memories. In postmemory, the conscious-
nesses involved in the intentional act multiply, making the subjectivity
behind the noesis and the noema plural and discontinuous.
This subjective discontinuity leads to other key differences between
a phenomenology of memory and a phenomenology of postmemory,
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the role of the imagination being a fundamental one. Ricoeur traces the
debate about the difference between memories and images, or memory
and the imagination, back to the writings of Plato and Aristotle. For
Plato, memory is fundamentally a form of re-presentation, in which
faithfulness to a memory object depends on the strength of the initial
impression it made. The image or icon that is formed in the representa-
tion erases the difference between the memory and its correlate. Aristo-
tle, however, distinguishes between two kinds of memory: mnēmē and
anamnēsis. The former refers to passive, simple memory, which arises
spontaneously in the manner of an affection (Ricoeur 2006, 17). The lat-
ter refers to recollection, which consists in an active search and an
“effort to recall” (2006, 19).5 The connection between the two is the role
played by temporal distance. The act of remembering only occurs after
time has elapsed. Time remains the common factor to both memory as
simple evocation and to recollection as action. Following Aristotle, Ri-
coeur argues that “the notion of temporal distance is inherent in the
essence of memory and assures the distinction in principle between
memory and imagination” (2006, 18). The temporal mark—the mark of
pastness—is key to understanding the distinctiveness of memory. Mem-
ory is, more than anything else, the experience of temporal distance.
However, the two extremes of the spectrum are connected. Ricoeur
(2006, 52) quotes Bergson: “to imagine is not to remember. No doubt a
recollection, as it becomes actual, tends to live in an image; but the
converse is not true, and the image, pure and simple, will not be
referred to the past unless, indeed, it was in the past that I sought it.”
Disentangling imagination from memory, then, requires focusing on
the difference in intentionality: while imagination is directed toward the
fantastic, the unreal, and the ﬁctional, memory is directed toward prior
reality, such that “the thing remembered” is always constituted by the
temporal mark. The estimation of time intervals, whether precise or
indeterminate, is part and parcel of what makes memory different from
imagination.
With this schema of memory versus the imagination in mind, I under-
stand postmemory as being something in-between: while still being di-
rected toward a prior reality, because the subject of postmemory has
not experienced that reality, the work of recalling it entails signiﬁcant
use of the imagination. It is from the ﬁrst instance recollection, and
therefore secondary in being a form of re-production; it is never pri-
mary in the sense of “simple memory” since the reference point is
never to the experience of an initial perception. The reference point is,
however, tied to the perception of another person’s experience, and
thus still grounded in a past reality. Postmemory therefore retains the
object-oriented character and temporal mark of memory, but from the
standpoint of another person’s consciousness. The effort to recall, then,
is creative; it is a practice of citation, mediation, and I would argue,
imagination.
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While Ricoeur (2006, 49) argues that “the world of experience” and
the “world of fantasy” are irreducible to one another, and that memories
belong to the former, postmemory seems in fact to be a hybrid of both.
With memory, one does not simply remember oneself, seeing, experien-
cing, learning; rather one recalls the situations in the world in which
one has had such experiences. Every situation implies one’s own body
and the bodies of others in lived space, and the view of a world within
which something has occurred. Remembering manifests the presence
of the absent world, not just the experience of the prior self. Places that
have been inhabited, where corporeal memory6 was practiced day in
and day out, in addition to the experiences of seeing, interacting, speak-
ing, learning, and so forth, are “memorable par excellence” (Ricoeur
2006, 42). The places persist as inscriptions for memory and can in turn
offer support for failing memory (41). But for the subject of postmem-
ory, that “presence” of the absent world manifests itself differently than
for the subject of memory. Ricoeur himself emphasizes the kinship
between memories and place when he says that “memories transmitted
only along the oral path ﬂy away as do the words themselves” (2006,
41). Postmemory, however, is precisely such a form of memorial trans-
mission that is produced along paths of communication that are
detached from the places of memories. Postmemory, in fact, must imag-
ine worlds. Diasporic postmemory in particular must actively conjure
up places, situations, and bodies from which it is not only temporally
discontinuous, but also spatially, culturally, and/or linguistically so.
Instead of reconstructing a memory-image from “pure memory,”7 dia-
sporic postmemory relies on a kind of analogical imaging that takes the
memories communicated by another person and translates them
through an existing visual archive of private and public images. This
process clearly involves more than the use of the visualizing function of
the imagination; it uses imagination in the way we think of the making
of ﬁction. And yet there still exists an “objective” correlate of the
experiences postmemory tries to recall, from a past that actually
occurred.
Ricoeur perhaps treads onto the problematic of postmemory without
naming it as such in his discussion of hallucination, memory, and his-
tory. On the one hand, Ricoeur very much pits memory against imagina-
tion, using hallucination as the example of imagination’s negative effect
on the processes of memory. He points out that recollection involves
the construction of memory-images that refer back to prior reality,
carrying “memory back . . . into a region of presence similar to that of
perception.” While one could argue that this is a kind of use of the imag-
ination, Ricoeur insists that it differs from the imagination’s function of
“derealization, [which] culminat[es] in a ﬁction exiled to the margins of
reality” (2006, 52). If one were to move from pure memory to pure
memory-image, Ricoeur maintains that memory then moves into the
pole of hallucination, which he deems the “pitfall of the imaginary for
Redeﬁning Diaspora through a Phenomenology of Postmemory
343
memory” (2006, 53) in that it “constitutes a sort of weakness, a dis-
credit, a loss of reliability for memory” (2006, 54). While this might be
true for a single subject of memory, the memory versus imagination dis-
tinction becomes less clear-cut when we consider the subjects of dia-
sporic postmemory who are always already searching for a prior reality
that requires the active use of their faculties of imagination. “Memory is
on the side of perception” (2006, 53), according to Ricoeur, but post-
memory is decidedly not since it has no trafﬁc with “pure memory”—
and yet postmemory retains the same thesis of reality that grounds
memory.
Interestingly enough, Ricoeur acknowledges that even though hallu-
cination is antithetical to memory as “a pathology of the imagination,” it
seems nonetheless related to collective memory. Drawing from the con-
clusions of Jean Paul Sartre’s The Psychology of Imagination, Ricoeur
observes that hallucination is marked by an obsession with “that which
is forbidden,” in which every effort “not to think about [something] any-
more” is spontaneously transformed into “obsessive thinking” (Sartre
qtd. in Ricoeur 2006, 54). In something of a tangent, Ricoeur makes the
connection to collective memory:
Confronting the phenomenon of fascination with the forbidden
object, how can we help but leap to the plane of the collective mem-
ory and evoke the sort of hauntedness, described by historians of the
present day, which stigmatizes this “past that does not pass”? Haunt-
edness is to collective memory what hallucination is to private mem-
ory, a pathological modality of the incrustation of the past at the
heart of the present. (2006, 54)
Ricoeur dichotomizes collective memory and private memory here, but
what happens when we consider postmemory, where collective mem-
ory and private memory intersect? Postmemory is at once haunted by
the collective and yet undeniably individual and private. It is often char-
acterized by a haunting and a longing for something that has been irre-
vocably lost (if not “forbidden”).
Postmemory shares an important feature with hallucination: it uses
imagination “to produce the object of one’s thought, the thing one de-
sires, in a manner that one can take possession of it” (2006, 53). How-
ever, to say that postmemory is a type of hallucination would be risible.
Perhaps it would be more convincing to consider postmemory in con-
nection to another activity that Ricoeur likens to quasi-hallucination—
the writing of history. Ricoeur does not fail to observe that, despite his
schema which uncouples memory from the imagination, the writing of
history employs memory and imagination together. He uses Michelet as
an example of “a certain way of writing history . . . in which the ‘resur-
rection’ of the past also tends to take on quasi-hallucinatory forms” and
asserts that, in this way, “writing history shares the adventures of mem-
ories put-into-images under the aegis of the ostensive function of
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imagination” (2006, 54). Postmemory, like the writing of history, is the
imaginative recollection of a(nother’s) prior reality. This is not an
empty similarity or coincidental parallel. When Ricoeur assures us that
the “theory of memory passes on to the theory of history” (2006, 54), he
is setting up the paradigm by which he develops an ethics of memory
(which he goes into in depth in the last part of Memory, History, For-
getting). If Ricoeur is right that the theory of memory passes on to the
theory of history, then postmemory is the hinge between them. Ricoeur
is able to develop an ethics of memory from such a paradigm precisely
because the working of postmemory implies an ethical exercise in its
nature as a speciﬁc search for the truth (implied in the intentional,
active search of the past) of an Other.
Postmemory is very much shaped by its production under the con-
text of affect in relation to the Other. As we observed at the beginning
of this phenomenological sketch, postmemory radically departs from
the noesis-noema of memory by virtue of the subjective discontinuity
between the two phases of intentionality. As such, the relationship
between the subject of postmemory and the Other whose conscious-
ness envelops the intentional object of memory is key to a phenomeno-
logical understanding of (diasporic) postmemory.
As discussed earlier, in distinguishing between the two kinds of
memory, Aristotle characterizes simple memory as a pathos, as an
affection, which distinguishes it from recollection, which is an action.
Postmemory has characteristics of both simple memory and recollec-
tion: it is more like recollection in that it is a more laborious, effortful
act, but it is like simple memory in that it can very much be character-
ized as an affection. The affection is different from that of simple mem-
ory, however, in that postmemory is directed not only toward the self
subject of the noesis, but also toward the other subject of the noema. It
involves a relational, embodied encounter with the Other that incites
empathic identiﬁcations. As such, the index of postmemory, unlike
memory, is “shaped more and more by affect, need, and desire as time
and distance attenuate the links to authenticity and truth” (Hirsch 2008,
124). Time and distance is even further complicated and inaccessible in
diasporic consciousness.
As a form of recollection, postmemory is the active search of an-
other’s past. Regarding recollection in memory, Ricoeur suggests that
“the initiative of the search stems from our ‘capacity for searching.’ The
starting point remains under the command of the explorer of the past,
whether the connection that follows is the result of necessity or of
habit” (2006, 18). This is not true of recollection in postmemory, where
there is no choice for the “explorer of the past”—the past is passed
onto them regardless of initiative or intentionality. What then is the
“capacity for searching” for the subject of postmemory? Is there such a
capacity? I would propose that there is, but that the capacity is different
in an important way: it is constituted by a reliance on the one—the
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Other—who remembers. Postmemory thus intrinsically implies a rela-
tionship of trust, as one listening to the testimony of a witness. Post-
memory entails a “capacity of searching” the Other, which in the
intimate context of familial relations also becomes a matter of search-
ing the self. This is especially important in diasporic consciousness, as
the way in which family members have been othered in a society in
which they might be marginalized for their racial features, or their cul-
tural practices, or their lack of linguistic ﬂuency in the dominant ton-
gue, gets passed onto the diasporic subject through the affections of
postmemory.
Emmanuel Lévinas (1979) has elaborated on the profound signiﬁ-
cance of the face-to-face encounter with the Other as the core element
of intersubjective life. The other person addresses me, calls to me, sim-
ply by presenting her face to me. This lived immediacy is essentially an
affective encounter that does not need language for a call-and-response
dynamic between two people. Lévinas, not surprisingly, focuses on the
universal “moments” of the family as constituent of both intersubjectiv-
ity and the formation of ethics. Beginning with “fecundity,”8 in which
the limits of time for the individual (one’s lifespan) are extended and
opened up by the child, who is both of the parent and other than the
parent, the life of the family continues through interactions of election
and responsibility between parents and children, and between siblings.
The family in this way mediates the passage from the individual to the
collective; the structure of postmemory functions within and is depen-
dent on this familial face-to-face dynamic and, in my view, shapes the
kind of intersubjectivity that leads to the phenomenological existence
of groups like diasporas.
The Role of Postmemory in Diasporic Consciousness
and Group Formation
How do we characterize the passage from individual diasporic con-
sciousness to the formation of diasporic groups? Related to this ques-
tion is another, more fundamental question: “is memory primordially
personal or collective” (Ricoeur 2006, 93)? The response does not have
to be either/or, although the tendency has been to fall on one side or
the other, with Sigmund Freud perhaps being on one end and Maurice
Halbwachs on the other. I follow Ricoeur, however, in the idea of a “dis-
tinct, yet reciprocal and interconnected, constitution of individual mem-
ory and collective memory” (2006, 95). The collective is already in
“individual” memory from the outset. Memories are always situated
with respect to other people and to places. When we look at a photo-
graph of ourselves, it sends us back to the milieu in which we were situ-
ated at the time. The external is always present, but we tend to think of
memories as essentially internal and uniﬁed only because the inﬂuence
of the social setting becomes imperceptible to us. Thus the sole
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attribution of memories to the individual who remembers is a faulty
claim; one never remembers alone. The social framework is a dimen-
sion inherent in the work of recollection. Alfred Schutz has argued that
“the experience of others is a given as primal as the experience of the
self” (qtd. in Ricoeur 2006, 130). We act with others, we affect others,
and we are affected by others. Life is always in one way or another life
that is lived together; subjects are from the outset members of a com-
munity or collectivity. Individuals are part of social groups with shared
belief systems that frame memories and shape them into narratives.
Following Ricoeur’s schema, individual consciousness necessarily in-
volves an analogical transfer to the Other, which leads to the intersub-
jectivity that is ultimately the foundation for the phenomenological
existence of collectives or groups like “diasporas.” Husserlian phenom-
enology proposes that the Other is constituted from “the sphere of own-
ness,” a reduction in which one abstracts everything in one’s
experience that is an experience of Otherness, leaving only what is
“mine.” And yet the ego forms intentionalities that transcend one’s own
being. The objective world is statically constituted as already ﬁnished
and alien to the ego, and the possibility of experiencing the world as
alien comes, ﬁrst, from the possibility of experiencing the alter ego as
Other: “On the one hand, it is indeed as foreign, that is as not-me, that
the other is constituted, but is ‘in’ me that he is constituted” (qtd. in Ri-
coeur 2006, 118). The sphere of ownness, and the analogical appercep-
tion that follows from it, leads to what Ricoeur (improvising on
Husserl’s concept of “social communalization”) calls the “communaliza-
tion of subjective experience” (2006, 119). From alter egos we get a
community of “Others”; and then the world as “there” for any member
of this community. From this starting point with Husserl,9 Ricoeur ar-
gues that intersubjectivity bears the weight of the constitution of collec-
tive identities (like diaspora) according to the analogical transfer that
Husserl ascribes to every alter ego in relation to one’s own ego. This is
how the ﬁrst person can become the ﬁrst person plural and still “retain”
the features of memory: “mineness,” “continuity,” and “the past-future
polarity.” It is only by analogy—in relation to individual consciousness
and its memory—that “collective memory is held to be a collection of
traces left by the events that have affected the course of history of the
groups concerned” (2006, 119). The analogical transfer allows us to ex-
tend the “mineness” of memories analogically to the idea of “our” pos-
sessing of “our” collective memories. Ricoeur shows how “this is
enough to give written history a point of anchorage in the phenomeno-
logical existence of groups” (2006, 120). “Diasporas” are just such these
kinds of groups, ones that exist phenomenologically in relation to a col-
lection of traces passed on from individuals of the displaced generation
to the postmemory of generations after.
Ricoeur suggests that “the level of our close relations,” which he de-
ﬁnes as “privileged others” who “approve of my existence and whose
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existence I approve of in the reciprocity and equality of esteem” (2006,
132), is an intermediate level of reference between the poles of individ-
ual memory and collective memory. Close relations occupy the middle
ground between the self and the “they,” and is the plane where “con-
crete exchanges operate between the living memory of individual per-
sons and the public memory of the communities to which we belong”
(2006, 131; emphasis added). The memory exchange that happens on
the level of close relations, which he calls a “memory of a distinct kind,”
is in fact what I have been referring to as postmemory. I would argue
that the level of familial close relations10 in particular is a crucial con-
duit for the formation of diasporic consciousness precisely because of
the concreteness, the embodied force, of its exchanges. The phenome-
non of diaspora demonstrates the production of the social bond within
the framework of interactive relations in familial space.
Diaspora is only interesting as a phenomenon when collective identi-
ﬁcations with a “homeland” are maintained by second, third, and subse-
quent generations. That migrants themselves invest in the preservation
of a distinctive identity and community is only to be expected (Bruba-
ker 2005, 7). What characterizes and explains the passage from dislo-
cated subjects to diaspora, I argue, are the processes of postmemory
and intersubjectivity, in which the familial structure of inheritance is
signiﬁcant. The family becomes a crucial unit of transmission of an em-
bodied form of memory that encompasses bodily and affective connec-
tions. For memory studies scholar Aleida Assman (qtd. in Hirsch 2008,
110), the family is the privileged site of memorial transmission because
memories are ﬁrst and foremost linked between individuals. “Group
memory” begins from the point of familial transfer of embodied experi-
ence to the next generation. Various forms of public memory, on the
other hand (national, political, cultural, archival, etc.), are primarily
mediated not through embodied practice but instead through symbolic
systems.
Critical race scholar Sara Ahmed (2007) similarly emphasizes the
importance of the familial space in producing phenomenological orien-
tations and subjectivity in her essay, “A Phenomenology of Whiteness.”
Building from Marx’s insight that although human beings “make their
own history, [they] do not make it as they please,” Ahmed suggests that
that process of “making” is delimited by the conditions they inherit
from the past. She observes that “if the conditions in which we live are
inherited from the past, they are ‘passed down’ not only in blood and
genes, but also through the work or labor of generations” (2007, 154).
This inheritance would include the social, cultural, and psychical orien-
tations that a person encounters from the moment of entry into the
world as a dependent child, not to mention the work of memory that is
performed in these familial spaces. Ahmed suggests that orientations
put certain things within reach, such as “styles, capacities, aspirations,
techniques, habits” in addition to physical objects (2007, 154). Though
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her essay refers to the orientation of “whiteness,” we can also see dia-
sporic postmemory as creating another such orientation.
One way in which diasporic postmemory orients a subject is through
its function as a form of family resemblance. Ahmed notes how white-
ness becomes a form of family resemblance, which explains how race
has been understood through familial metaphors: “Race in this model
‘extends’ the family form; other members of the race are ‘like a family,’
just as the family is deﬁned in racial terms” (2007, 154). This relates to
diasporic consciousness in that the same extension of the family meta-
phor occurs in the related discourse of the nation; both race and nation
are deeply entangled with diasporic discourse. The analogy that mem-
bers of the nation or race are “like a family” works powerfully to pro-
duce not only a particular rendering of race and/or nation, but also a
particular rendering of family that is based on likeness as a sign of
inheritance. The discourse of “family resemblance,” in Ahmed’s view,
has a powerful function as a legislative device. She reﬂects on the say-
ing “like two peas in a pod”:
Anyone who has shelled peas would know of course that peas are
not only alike and that seeing them as being alike is already to over-
look some important differences. But it’s the pod and not the peas
that interests me here. This saying suggests for me that likeness is an
effect of the proximity of shared residence. This is not just an argu-
ment about nurture over nature (that the pod is a nurturing device),
as this way of thinking relies on an overly simple logic of causality
(the pod causes the peas). Rather the very proximity of pea-to-pea,
as well as the intimacy of the dwelling, which surrounds them like a
skin, shapes the very form of the peas. Likeness is not then ‘in’ the
peas, let alone ‘in’ the pod, but is an effect of their contiguity, of how
they are touched by each other and envelop each other. (Ahmed
2007, 155)
The familial is like the “pod,” as a shared space of dwelling, in which
things are shaped by their proximity to other things. Bodies come to be
seen alike, as for instance sharing a race, or a “homeland,” as a “charac-
teristic.” Such “characteristics” are an effect of proximities where cer-
tain memories, experiences, and “truths” are already in place. Ahmed
suggests that such proximities are inherited, which means that “[the]
past that is ‘behind’ our arrival restricts as well as enables human action:
if we are shaped by ‘what’ we come into contact with, then we are also
shaped by what we inherit, which de-limits the objects that we might
come into contact with” (2007, 155). Diasporic consciousness forms out
of the “foreignness” of the multiple worlds that one has inherited, such
that the world that the diasporic subject inhabits is perpetually haunted
by the absence of another, distant world. For the second generation
of self-identiﬁed “diaspora,” the world they inherit is one in which their
parents experienced varying types and degrees of alienation, loss, and
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nostalgia for a “homeland.” But the chain of inheritance often does not
stop with the second generation. The transfer of diasporic postmemory
and identiﬁcation to subsequent generations can occur vis-à-vis a vari-
ety of “inheritances” of proximity, such as the effects of racial and ethnic
categorizations circulating in larger society, marginalization as an
“Other,” social and cultural practices of “boundary maintenance,” identi-
ﬁcation with already-formed parental identities/ideologies, the affect and
practices of long-distance nationalism, and so forth, that are passed onto
the subject of postmemory. Diasporic postmemory reproduces and
evolves when buttressed by reinforcements of external exclusion as
well as internal “likeness.” The passage from postmemory to diaspora
happens when an individual’s consciousness coheres to cultures, values,
bodies, and places from the familial past as properties of itself. Diasporic
identiﬁcation thus is “an effect of what coheres, rather than the origin of
coherence” (Ahmed 2007, 159; emphasis added).
Diaspora, a Becoming
Diaspora is better understood phenomenologically than ontologi-
cally. Diaspora does not refer to a static, homogeneous entity bound
together by some common essence or purity. Nor does it refer to a
mere ﬂourish of language, strategic practice, or oppositional stance em-
ployed by the marginalized and disenfranchised. Diaspora instead refers
to a certain experience, or as Stuart Hall describes it, a becoming:
Cultural identity . . . is a matter of “becoming” as well as of “being”. It
belongs to the future as much as to the past. It is not something
which already exists, transcending place, time, history, and culture.
Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories. But, like
everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation.
Far from being eternally ﬁxed in some essentialized past, they are
subject to the continuous “play” of history, culture, and power . . .
identities are the names we give to the different ways we are posi-
tioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past.
(1990, 225)
A deﬁnition of diaspora that emphasizes the experience of diaspora—
diaspora as becoming—allows us to move away from universalizing
generalizations and the pitfalls of essentialism and assimilationist teleo-
logism. Anchoring it to a phenomenology of postmemory compels us to
attend to how collective histories and individual narratives of the past
produce diasporic experience in complex relation to the relentless play
of history, culture, and power in larger society. As such, redeﬁning dia-
spora through a phenomenology of postmemory can help us account
more adequately for the realms of heterogeneity, hybridity, discontinu-
ity, and evolution in diasporic experience without denying its “reality.”
Diaspora is real.
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Notes
1. The author thanks Bruce Smith and Khachig Tölölyan for their very helpful feedback on this manu-
script.
2. Nadine Fresco conducted a series of interviews with others of her generation whose parents never
spoke of their lives in their home countries or of their experiences of war. She argues that these re-
pressed stories nevertheless shaped them as a diaspora des cendres [“diaspora of the ashes”]. Fresco
referred to this experience as “absent memory,” which Hirsch recasts as postmemory, emphasizing
that such a memory is not “empty” or “absent,” but full, present, and invested in its own right (Hirsch
1997, 243–4).
3. Of course, these cases are not mutually exclusive. One can be traumatized by forceful displacement,
for instance. Or a collective trauma can involve the massive displacement of a group of people, the
Holocaust being an obvious example. Hirsch’s own work constantly links the experience of trauma
with exile/diaspora in postmemory. However, in my view, it is important to separate out the terms
clearly before analyzing them together.
4. A case in point is how postmemory has been usefully applied to the aftermath of the “Dirty War” in
Argentina. See Nouzeilles 2005 and Kaiser 2006 for examples.
5. Husserl made a similar distinction: primary memory (retention) versus secondary memory
(reproduction). Primary memory as retention is “not now”; it is necessary that a corresponding per-
ception precede the retention. But retention hangs onto the perception of the moment. The percep-
tion is “just past”; so retention is a temporal extension of that experience. Secondary memory,
however, entails reproduction, which assumes that the primary memory of a temporal object has
“disappeared” and that it comes back. It is still different from imagination because of the positional
dimension of recollection: “Recollection . . . posits what is reproduced and in this positing gives it a
position in relation to the actually present now and to the sphere of the original temporal ﬁeld to
which the recollection itself belongs.” The reproduction then is now, but it coincides with the real
past (Ricoeur 2006, 31–6).
6. Corporeal memory refers to habits of the body, or sensual knowledge, enacted repeatedly in lived
space. It bears similarities to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus in its emphasis on embodiment and
unconscious inculcation.
7. “Pure memory” refers to memory that has not yet been put into images. It aligns with the uncon-
scious and is an existence “comparable to that [sic] we attribute to external things when we do not
perceive them” (Ricoeur 2006, 51, 431).
8. Although this word is problematic in that it strikes of a kind of biologism, a paradigm of the “famil-
ial” can be extended to analogous relationships of both formal and informal “adoption,” as well as, to a
lesser degree, broader social relations dispersed according to multiple orders of belonging.
9. Ricoeur is careful, however, to distance himself from the transcendental idealism implied in Hus-
serl’s method. He asks, “in order to reach the notion of common experience, must we begin with the
idea of ownness, pass through the experience of the other, and ﬁnally proceed to a third operation,
said to the communalization of subjective experience? Is this chain truly irreversible? Is it not the spec-
ulative presupposition of transcendental idealism that imposes this irreversibility, rather than any con-
straint characteristic of phenomenological description?” (2006, 119). In my view, a non-transcendental
idealist approach to Husserl’s ideas leaves open the possibility that the chain is not irreversible nor
even necessarily a “chain” with discrete or sequential phases. Simultaneity and mutual constitution
would not change the thesis of analogical transfer. Husserl’s schema is thus valuable as a heuristic for
understanding intersubjectivity.
10. See note 8 for a caveat concerning the concept of the “familial.”
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